Chechens are the new Wagner in the Eastern area of Ukraine. The Kremlin may be attempting to reintroduce Kadyrovites as the main offensive force following the culmination of Wagner forces and their withdrawal from the frontlines.
The Battle of Bakhmut exposed several key flaws in the Russian planning and conduct of operational maneuver. The Russian military command continued to pursue a relentless assault on Bakhmut after the city lost its original operational significance and failed to adjust its military objectives appropriately. The Kremlin, evidently, chased after any potential victory to generate informational effects and allowed Prigozhin to expend a large amount of Russian ammunition and thousands of prisoner recruits and then more professional forces to maintain a battle of no operational significance in Bakhmut. Prigozhin also continued this battle to gain desired political standing in Russia – likely without the intent to pursue the original goal of conducting a wider encirclement of Donbas. The Kremlin’s fixation with Bakhmut indicates that Russia has not learned lessons from the first phases of the war. The Russian military command continues to overestimate Russian military capabilities and has not mastered time and space relationships in this war at its current level of effectiveness. The Russian military command also continues to pursue ill-informed political objectives at the expense of Russian personnel and resources.
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The official Russian responses to recent attacks against Russia remain likely insufficient to satisfy the Russian ultranationalist information space’s desire for escalation in the war. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov called on Russian forces on May 29 to capture Kharkiv City and Kharkiv Oblast to create a barrier between Belgorod Oblast and Ukraine.[17] Gladkov later announced on May 31 the evacuation of children from the border areas of Shebekino and Grayvoron raions — including 300 children relocated to Voronezh Oblast — in response to the “deteriorating” border situation.[18]
- The Russian military command has likely ordered Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s forces to begin offensive operations in Ukraine following the withdrawal of Wagner Group forces from Bakhmut.
- The claimed return of Chechen forces to offensive operations would break Kadyrovites from a nearly yearlong hiatus from participating in high-intensity combat operations.
- The Kremlin may be attempting to reintroduce Kadyrovites as the main offensive force following the culmination of Wagner forces and their withdrawal from the frontlines.
- The Kremlin may also be attempting to sever Kadyrov’s relationship with Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and re-emphasize federal authority over Chechen forces.
- The official Russian responses to recent attacks against Russia remain likely insufficient to satisfy the Russian ultranationalist information space’s desire for escalation in the war.
- Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
- Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
- Russian forces continue to concentrate in southern Ukraine.
- The Russian State Duma appears to be considering measures to legalize the military recruitment of current or formerly incarcerated Russian men.
- Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced that Ukraine has a new avenue to repatriate Ukrainian children abducted to Russia.
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna on May 30. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in 13 clashed in the Kupyansk and Kreminna directions.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks northwest of Svatove near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk); near Novoselivske and Stelmakhivka (both about 15km northwest of Svatove); and south of Kreminna near Kuzmyne (2km southwest) and Bilohorivka (10km south).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to advance near Krokhmalne (20km northwest of Svatove) but that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances northeast of Bilohorivka.[25] Another Russian milblogger posted footage showing Russian forces firing on Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction with incendiary munitions.[26]
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on May 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northeast of Bakhmut) and Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces aim to capture Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) to set conditions for future efforts to advance in the Kramatorsk direction (34km northwest of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces have increased artillery strikes in this direction.[31] The milblogger also claimed that fighting is ongoing between Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut) and that positional battles continue near Klishchiivka. The milblogger claimed that conventional Russian forces, volunteer formations and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) security forces are establishing positions in Bakhmut as Wagner forces continue their ongoing relief-in-place. Geolocated footage published on May 31 shows the irregular formation 1st “Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade, previously active in the Avdiivka area, operating near Zaliznyanske (9km northwest of Bakhmut).[32] This unit’s presence near Zaliznyanske supports ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are likely transferring irregular forces and DNR elements from the Avdiivka area to the Bakhmut area.[33]
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Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continue to concentrate in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces are replacing old and worn equipment — including T-72 and T-62 tanks and air defenses — in southern Ukraine. Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces are moving the equipment towards Manhush (14km southwest of Mariupol) and Berdyansk out of fear of Ukrainian strikes on Mariupol.[42] Geolocations of Andryuchenko’s imagery confirm that Russian forces are moving the equipment in Mariupol.[43]
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Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to increase physical control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Ukrainian Representative to the UN Serhiy Kyslytsya stated on May 31 that Russian forces continue using the ZNPP for military purposes and have deployed 500 personnel and 50 pieces of military equipment to the plant. Kyslytsya reported that the Russians store military equipment and ammunition in the turbine halls of ZNPP reactors No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4.[49] Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom reported that Russian occupation authorities are torturing Ukrainian ZNPP personnel to coerce the personnel into signing contracts with Russian nuclear energy operator Rosatom, which has its own presence at the ZNPP.[50] International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi called on all parties to agree to five principles for ensuring safety at the ZNPP: no attacks against the ZNPP or critical infrastructure; no storing military equipment or personnel at the ZNPP; guarantee power to the ZNPP; protect all critical infrastructure from attacks; take no actions to undermine these principles.[51] Kyslytsya called on Grossi to include in his principles: the complete withdrawal of Russian military and ZNPP personnel from the ZNPP; insuring that the ZNPP is connected to Ukrainian power grids; and insuring that the passage of management and maintenance personnel to and from the ZNPP is safe.[52]
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